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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The proper interpretation which should be given South Caro-
lina's long-arm statute' remains unclear even though the South
Carolina Supreme Court has recently handed down three opin-
ions2 dealing with the question of personal jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants. The statute, reenacted in 19723 to cure con-
stitutional deficiencies in the initial version,4 had been declared
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-801 to -801 to -806. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-803 provides
as follows: #
Personal Jurisdiction Based Upon Conduct. (1) A court may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a person [defined in §10.2-801 to include a corporation]
who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's
(a) transacting any business in this State;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in the State;
(c) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in the State;
(d) causing tortious injury or death in this State by an act or omission
outside this State if he regularly does or solicits business or engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this State; or
(e) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this State;
or
(f) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this
State at the time of contracting; or
(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by either
party in this State; or
(h) production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with the reasona-
ble expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this State
and are so used or consumed.
(2) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a
cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted
against him, and such action, if brought in this State shall not be subject to the
provisions of § 10-310(3).
2. Jacobs v. Association of Independent Colleges and Schools, 265 S.C. 459, 219
S.E.2d 837 (1975); Nucor Corp:v. Fanevil Const. Inc., 264 S.C. 458,215 S.E.2d 634 (1975);
Peeler v. South Carolina Helicopters, Inc., 263 S.C. 487, 211 S.E.2d 344 (1975).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-801 to 809 (Spec. Supp. 1966) enacted as No. 1065 [1966]
S.C. Acts & Jt.Res. 4027, reenacted as No. 1343 (1972); S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2518. The
statute was patterned after the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, §
1.03, 9B U.L.A. 307, 310 (1966).
4. In a series of cases after the statute was originally enacted, courts sustained chal-
lenges to the act on the ground that it violated art. 3, § 17 of the South Carolina
Constitution, which requires that "every act or joint resolution having the force of law
shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." McGee v. Holan
Div. of Ohio Brass Co., 337 F. Supp. 72 (D.S.C. 1972); Tention v. Southern Pacific R.R.,
336 F. Supp. 25 (D.S.C. 1972). The basis for the challenge was that the long-arm statute
appears as one section of the state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code § 10.2-
803(1)(c) & (d) dealt with tortious activity unrealted to commercial transactions, the
1
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constitutional by the court in 1974.- Unfortunately, the statute
was applied in only one6 of these three most recent cases. The
failure of the court to discuss the long-arm statute, despite cir-
cumstances which seem to make it clearly applicable, raises per-
plexing questions as to its meaning. Because the statute is rela-
tively new, 7 few cases have arisen interpreting its provisions.' No
previous case discusses the statute's provisions for exercising ju-
risdiction in tort cases. Two of the cases9 decided during this
survey period turned on the question of jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants who were alleged to have committed torts
against South Carolina residents. Although the supreme court
subject of the act. Additionally, no notice was given by the title to the act that it contained
long-arm provisions for causes of action totally divorced from commercial transactions.
Therefore, the statute was held to be in violation of the South Carolina Constitution. For
a further discussion of the history and problems of the Act, see Comment, "South Caro-
lina's Uniform Commercial Code - The Demise of Its Long-Arm Provisions," 24 S.C.L.
REv. 474 (1972).
5. In Thompson v. Hofmann, 263 S.C. 314, 210 S.E.2d 461 (1974), plaintiff brought
suit against a non-resident individual for alienation of affection, invoking jurisdiction
pursuant to § 10.2-803(1)(c). The defendant appeared specially to contest jurisdiction,
contending that the reenacted version of the statute was still in violation of art. 3, § 17 of
the South Carolina Constitution. The court, by a 3-2 majority, upheld the act's constitu-
tionality, noting its remedial nature. The court rejected defendant's formalistic argument
that the act still related to more than one subject, in violation of art. 3, § 17. The court
additionally held the statute to apply to any actions commenced after its passage, regard-
less of when the cause of action arose. Chief Justice Moss, joined by Justice Littlejohn,
vehemently dissented, urging that the attempted curative reenactment had not suc-
ceeded. They argued that the act still violated art. 3, § 17 because it related to two subjects
and that the title, even after reenactment, gave no notice that tort actions, as distinct from
commercial transactions, contracts or documents, were embraced by its procedural sec-
tions. The Thompson case is discussed more fully in Practice and Procedure, 1975 Survey
of South Carolina Law, 27 S.C.L. REv. 518 (1975).
6. Nucor Corp. v. Fanevil Construction, Inc., 264 S.C. 458, 215 S.E.2d 634 (1975).
7. See cases cited in note 4 supra, and cases collected in annotations to S.C. CODE
ANN, §§ 10-424, 10.2-801 to -806, and 12-23.14.
8. Thompson v. Hofmann, 263 S.C. 314, 210 S.E.2d 461 (1974), involved the question
of the statute's constitutionality, but the court did not discuss the specific application of
the statute's provisons. In Engineered Products v. Cleveland Crane & Engineering, 262
S.C. 1, 201 S.E.2d 921 (1974), the court applied and discussed the statute in a contract
action. See note 31 and accompanying text infra. In Solomon v. City Realty Co., 262 S.C.
198, 203 S.E.2d 435 (1974), the court upheld service of process under the statute in a
contract action but did not discuss the statutory provisions in detail. In Anderson v. Pou,
262 S.C. 175, 203 S.E.2d 391 (1974), an action for false arrest, the court denied jurisdiction
but made only passing reference to the act. In Triplett v. R.M. Wade, 261 S.C. 419, 200
S.E.2d 375 (1973), another tort suit, the court's opinion was based upon §§ 10-424 and
12-23.14 and mentioned the long-arm statute only as indicating a legislative intent to
broaden the jurisdiction of state courts.
9. Jacobs v. Ass'n of Independent Colleges and Schools, 265 S.C. 459, 219 S.E.2d 837
(1975); Peeler v. South Carolina Helicopters, Inc., 263 S.C. 487, 211 S.E.2d 344 (1975).
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was given an opportunity in both cases to clarify the application
of the new long-arm provisions, it declined to do so, leaving the
jurisdictional waters in that area as murky as ever.
In Peeler v. South Carolina Helicopters, Inc.,10 the plaintiff
sued for personal injuries suffered from the crash of a helicopter
in which he was riding. Plaintiff had purchased the helicopter
from South Carolina Helicopters, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
"Helicopters"), whose president was piloting the craft at the time
of the accident. After commencement of the suit, defendant at-
tempted to join R.J. Enstrom Corp. (hereinafter referred to as
"Enstrom"), the manufacturer of the helicopter, as a party defen-
dant and to amend its answer to include a cross-claim against
Enstrom."
Enstrom appeared specially to contest jurisdiction, moving
to quash service and to dismiss it from the action. Enstrom as-
serted that it was chartered in Michigan and was not authorized
to do business in South Carolina. It additionally alleged that it
had no officers, bank accounts or employees in this state and
10. 263 S.C. 487, 211 S.E.2d 344 (1975).
11. Plaintiff originally filed suit in United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina against Enstrom alone, but Judge Chapman sustained Enstrom's motion
to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff had served process pursuant to § 10-
424 of the S.C. Code of laws, see note 22 infra, but the court, in an order dated September
26, 1972, found that Enstrom did not have sufficient minimum contacts with this state
to support a finding that it was doing business here and thus was not amenable to service
of process under § 10-424. Judge Chapman emphasized that
even though representatives of the defendant have infrequently visited South
Carolina in the past few years seeking business, these visits have not been
successful in producing orders or sales activity. South Carolina Helicopters, Inc.
remains the only customer of the defendant within this state and sales to it are
on an order basis and are completely unplanned and unforseeable. The above
figures show that the average dollar amount of business done in South Carolina
in the past four years is minimal and the cause of action stated in the complaint
does not arise out of any of the defendant's activites within the State of South
Carolina.
Transcript at 43-44
Plaintiff subsequently instituted this litigation in state court against Helicopters,
which had not been aimed as a party defendant in the abortive federal court action. The
lower court, Grimball, J. presiding, disagreed with the District Court's decision on several
grounds: (1) interpretations of South Carolina jurisdictional statutes by the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court are controlling as to both the Federal and lower state courts and a
review of its decisions reveals that jurisdiction is proper; (2) South Carolina Helicopters,
Inc., was not a party in the federal court action; (3) the burden of proving jurisdiction in
the federal courts is upon the party asserting jurisdiction, whereas in state court it rests
upon the party challenging jurisdiction; (4) additional facts are before the state court; and
(5) Judge Chapman's order was not appealed and is, in fact, inconsistent with the Fourth
Circuit's most recent decision on this question. Transcript at 65-66.
3
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denied that it had any network of customers which it systemati-
cally serviced. The Circuit Court of Common Pleas for Richland
County denied the motion,1 2 and Enstrom appealed. The Su-
preme court affirmed.
Although the court unanimously held that the exercise of
jurisdiction was proper, the justices were divided over the basis
upon which to uphold the trial court. Justice Littlejohn, in an
opinion in which Chief Justice Moss concurred, made no mention
of the long-arm statute, but focused instead upon the four factors
set forth in Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Co.,13 a pre-statute
case, for determining whether a foreign corporation has sufficient
contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion will not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice."" Justice Bussey, writing for two fellow justices and
12. The trial court found that on six specific occasions between 1969 and 1972, and
on several other occasions not recorded, officers or agents of Enstrom came to South
Carolina in connection with or promotion of its business interests, including the inspection
of the wreckage and the site of the crash. Additionally, the trial court found that Helicop-
ters had for a number of years purchased parts on an open account with Enstrom, that it
had received promotional materials from Enstrom, and that two officers of Helicopters
had been certified by Enstrom to service Enstrom helicopers. Enstrom, after originally
manufacturing the helicopter, sold it to a party in Maryland. Helicopters purchased the
aircraft after it crashed in Maryland and had then taken it to Enstrom's Michigan plant
for repairs. There Helicopters' President and another employee, along with Enstrom's
personnel, repaired the helicopter, with Helicopter's paying Enstrom over $20,000 for
repair parts and labor. Enstrom then certified the aircraft as "airworthy" and it was taken
to South Carolina, where it subsequently crashed.
13. 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508 (1960). In Boney, plaintiffs sought to bring a Florida
corporation within the jurisdiction of this state in a tort suit arising out of an accident
which occurred while defendant was conducting dredging operations on the Savannah
River, which forms the boundary between Georgia and South Carolina. The court, finding
that defendant's tortious act was committed in South Carolina during the course of con-
tinuous business activities over a ten-month period within the state, upheld service of
process under S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-722 (current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-23.14).
The court cited four factors to be considered in deciding whether the exercise of jurisdic-
tion comports with due process:
(1) The duration of the corporate activity in the state;
(2) the character of the corporate acts;
(3) the circumstances of the corporate acts; and
(4) the inconveniences of the parties which would arise from conferring or
refusing to confer jurisdiction over the non-resident corporation. 237 S.C. at 62,
115 S.E.2d at 512.
14. The quoted phrase is taken from the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), where the Court wrote: ". . . due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." 326 U.S. at 316.
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concurring in the court's holding,15 argued that since the court's
decision in Thompson v. Hofmann"5 had held the long-arm stat-
ute constitutional, jurisdiction should have been sustained by
virtue of that statute without resort to prior case law. However,
the concurring opinion was brief and did not discuss in detail the
application of the long-arm statute.
The difficulty arising from this case stems from the court's
failure to apply the long-arm statute prior to engaging in a due
process analysis. It has repeatedly been held that questions of
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants involve a two-
fold analysis.' 7 First, the court must determine whether there is
an applicable state statute authorizing the exercise of jurisdic-
tion. If there is the court must then determine whether the appli-
cation of the statute to the particular case is consistent with due
process. In Peeler the court failed to deal with the first question.
Justice Littlejohn asserted that the legislature intended to extend
the jurisdiction of state courts over foreign defendants to the
limits of the Due Process Clause. Thus he apparently assumed
that it was sufficient simply to find that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Enstrom met the requirements of due process.
While both the federal courts"8 and the South Carolina Su-
preme Court 9 have asserted that this was in fact the legislature's
intent by enacting section 10.2-803, it is simply not clear from a
close reading of the long-arm statute that the legislature did in
fact so extend the jurisdiction of state courts. 2 If the court's as-
15. 263 S.C. 495, 211 S.E.2d 347 (1975) (Bussey, J., concurring).
16. 263 S.C. 314, 210 S.E.2d 461 (1974).
17. See Hardy v. Pioneer Parachute Co., Inc., 531 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1976); Ratliff v.
Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971).
18. Hardy v. Pioneer Parachute Co., Inc., 531 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1976); Bass v. Harbor
Light Marina, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 786 (D.S.C. 1974); Deering Milliken Research Corp. v.
Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 491 (D.S.C. 1970).
19. Triplett v. R.M. Wade & Co., 261 S.C. 419, 200 S.E.2d 375 (1973).
20. Section 10.2-803 provides for specific grounds upon which personal jurisdiction
may be invoked, and unless one of these grounds is found to apply, the service is void.
Subsection (1)(a) requires the "transaction of business," which is a term of art meaning
to do substantial business, a relatively stringent test. Subsectiozis (1)(b), (1)(e), (1)(f) and
(1)(g) pertain to non-residents who enter contracts which have a significant relationship
to the state, or to non-residents who possess an interest in realty located within the state.
In these types of cases there will not usually be a substantial question as to whether
jurisdiction is proper. Subsection (1)(c) requires the commission of a tortious act in whole
or in part in the state, and subsection (1)(d) permits jurisdiction over a defendant acting
outside the state and causing injury in the state only if that defendant also "regularly does
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or services rendered, in this state."
1976]
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sumption about legislative intent were correct, it would not have
been necessary for the legislature to specify in detail the grounds
for exercising jurisdiction in section 10.2-803.1 In view of the
foregoing discussion, the proper resolution of the issue in Peeler
would have been to analyze section 10.2-803 in order to determine
clearly that its provisions justify the exercise of jurisdiction in
this case.
A related question arises in this context concerning proper
service of process. The South Carolina Code contains three provi-
sions authorizing service of process on non-resident corporations:
sections 10-42412 and 10-23.14(a) 23 authorize service of process
Reading subsections (1)(c) and (1)(d) together, it seems reasonable to exclude from
the jurisdiction of South Carolina courts those cases where a non-resident manufacturer
ships a defective product to a retailer in another state, where it is subsequently purchased
by a South Carolina domiciliary who is then injured by the chattel. Some courts, faced
with facts similar to those here hypothesized, have held that the manufacturer
"committed" a tort in the state where the injury occurred, thus enabling the state court
to assume jurisdiction under a provision similar to subsection (1)(c). See Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). This would
not appear to be consistent with the language of the South Carolina statute, however,
since subsection (1)(d) seems clearly to apply to this type of situation. Unless the manu-
facturer had reasonably substantial contact with the state other than that occurring with
the single allegedly tortious act, jurisdiction would not be proper.
Subsection (1)(h) is the broadest provision of the Act, authorizing jurisdiction when
a tort is committed arising from goods which are produced, manufactured or distributed
with the reasonable expectation that they will be used or consumed in the state, and when
they are in fact so used or consumed. By broadly construing the term "reasonable expecta-
tion," the supreme court could extend the jurisdiction of state courts to include a situation
such as that posited above. However, until such a construction is given, it is not clear that
this subsection justifies the assertion that the legislature intended to extend the jurisdic-
tion of state courts to the limits of due process. Finally, § 10.2-803(2) stipulates that if
jurisdiction is based solely on § 10.2-803(1) the cause of action must arise from the acts
enumerated therein.
21. For an example of a long-arm statute which clearly extends the jurisdiction of the
state's courts to the limits of the due process clause, see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10
(West 1973), which reads: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-424 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides in part:
Service on foreign corporations generally. - If the suit be against a foreign
corporation .. . the summons and any other legal paper may be served by
delivering a copy to any officer, agent or employee of the corporation found at
the place within this state designated by the stipulation or declaration filed by
the corporation pursuant to § 12-721. [Section 12-721 has been repealed and
replaced by § 12-23.2] But if such foreign corporation transacts business in this
state without complying with that section, such service may be made by leaving
a copy of the paper with a fee of one dollar in the hands of the Secretary of State
or in his office, and such service shall be deemed sufficient service and shall have
like force and effect in all respects as service upon citizens of this state found
within its limits if notice of such service and a copy of the paper served are
6
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only where the foreign corporation is transacting or doing busi-
forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant foreign corpo-
ration and the defendant's return receipt and the plaintiff's affidavit of compli-
ance therewith are filed in the cause and submitted to the court from which such
process or other paper issued ....
(Emphasis added.)
23. S.C. Code Ann. 12-23.14 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides as follows:
Service of process on foreign corporation not authorized to do business in
state - (a) Every foreign corporation which is not authorized to do business in
this state shall, by doing in this state, either itself or through an agent, any
business, including any business for which authority need not be obtained as
provided by § 12-23.1, be deemed to have designated the Secretary of State as
its agent upon whom process against it may be served in any action or proceed-
ing arising out of or in connection with the doing of any business in this state.
(Emphasis added).
Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section provide for the procedures to be followed
in serving process upon a foreign corporation pursuant to subsection (a). Chapter 1.13 of
the South Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1962, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-23.1 to -23.11
(1962) deals with foreign corporations. Section 12-23.1 provides that a foreign corporation
shall not do business within the state unless authorized to do so (pursuant to § 12-23.2
and 12-23.3) and further specifies certain activities which a foreign corporation may en-
gage in without being deemed to be doing business in this state. Subsection (c) expressly
provides that this section has no applicability to a determination of whether a foreign
corporation may be subjected to service of process. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7765 (1942) con-
tained the provisions which were codified separately in the 1952 Code as §§ 10-424, 12-
721 and 12-722. In Thiel v. Electric Sales & Supply Co., 187 F. Supp. 640 (D.S.C. 1960)
and Foster v. Morrison, 226 S.C. 149, 84 S.E.2d 344 (1954) (Stokes, J., dissenting), it was
noted that these three sections should be construed together. Since former § 12-721 is now
encompassed within S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-23.2, and present § 12-23.14 contains substan-
tially similar provisions to those previously contained in § 12-722, it seems proper to
construe present § § 10-424, 12-23.2 and 12-23.14 in a manner consistent with each other.
See Triplett v. R. M. Wade & Co., 261 S.C. 419, 200 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1973). Thus, where
a foreign corporation, not authorized to do buiness in this state, "transacts" or "does"
business so as to establish sufficient minimum contacts with the state, service of process
under either § 10-424 or § 12-23.14 would be valid. Although the specific procedures to be
followzd are not identical, the provisions of both sections apply in situations where a
foreign corporation not authorized to do business (pursuant to §§ 12-23.2 and 12-23.3) can
be shown to have conducted sufficient activities within the state such that exercise of
personal jurisdiction by this state would not violate the mandates of the Due Process
Clause.
The long-arm provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-
803 to -806 also apply to non-resident corporations not authorized to do business in South
Carolina. If such a corporation is found to be "transacting any business" in the state, §
10.2-803(1)(a), service of process may be made upon it pursuant to § 10.2-804 and § 10.2-
806. However, if § 10.2-803(1)(a) is the sole basis for such exercise of jurisdiction, § 10.2-
803(2) requires that the cause of action arise from such transaction of business. The test
of whether the foreign corporation is "transacting any business" in the state would be
governed by the same due process standards as the tests for § 10-424 and § 12-23.14, viz.
sufficient minimum contacts such that the exercise of jurisdiction by this state will not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Similarly, where jurisdiction
is sought to be conferred upon a non-resident corporation under any of the other subsec-
tions of § 10.2-803(1), this standard will apply.
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ness in the State; section 10.2-804 4 provides for service of process
upon such corporation if jurisdiction is authorized pursuant to
any of the provisions of the long-arm statute. Section 10.2-
803(1)(a)25 authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction when
the corporation transacts business in the state. Clearly then, the
court must find that the non-resident corporation is transacting
business pursuant to section 10.2-803(1)(a) before service of pro-
cess can be upheld under either sections 10-424 or 12-23.14. Al-
though the Peeler court found that Enstrom had sufficient con-
tacts with the state that would justify requiring it to defend the
suit here, the court did not first determine that the exercise of
jurisdiction was authorized pursuant to section 10.2-803.
Several provisions of the long-arm statute appear as possible
bases for sustaining jurisdiction in this case. The court might
have found that Enstrom transacted business in the state (section
10.2-803(1)(a)); or contracted to supply services or things in the
state (section 10.2-803(1)(b)); or committed a tortious act in
whole or in part in the state (section 10.2-803(1)(c)); or caused
tortious injury in the state by an act or omission outside the state
while regularly doing or soliciting business in the state (section
10.2-803(1)(d)); or produced, manufactured, or distributed goods
with the reasonable expectation that the goods would be and were
used or consumed in the state (section 10.2-803(1)(h)). Unless the
court found one or more of these sections applicable to Enstrom's
conduct, it should have reversed the trial court. The failure of the
court to discuss and apply section 10.2-803 renders the decision
in Peeler confusing and unpersuasive.
In Nucor Corp. v. Fanevil Construction Co., Inc.,26 handed
down five months after Peeler, the court unanimously affirmed a
finding by the circuit court that a foreign corporation was amena-
ble to suit in this state under the provisions of section 10.2-
803(1)(g).11 Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation with a division lo-
cated in Florence, manufactured steel joists to be used by defen-
dant, a Massachusetts corporation, in the construction of a school
building in Massachusetts. Defendant returned the steel joists to
24. S.C. Code Ann. § 10.2-804 (1962) reads as follows: "Service outside the state.
- When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this section, service may
be made outside the state." S.C. Code Ann. § 10.2-806 (1962) prescribes the manner and
proof of such service.
25. For the text of this provision see note 1 supra.
26. 264 S.C. 458, 215 S.E.2d 634 (1975).
27. For the text of this provision see note 1 supra.
[Vol. 28
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plaintiff upon receiving them, claiming they were not satisfac-
tory. When the rebuilt joists proved unsatisfactory, defendant
refused further payment. Plaintiff served process upon defendant
pursuant to section 10-424 of the Code"8 and brought this action
to recover the amount due on the contract. Defendant appeared
specially to contest jurisdiction, alleging that it did no business,
had no agents and owned no property in this state, nor has con-
ducted any activity which could properly subject it to the juris-
diction of a South Carolina court.29 The Court of Common Pleas,
Florence County, ruled that it had jurisdiction, and defendant
appealed.
In a brief opinion, Chief Justice Moss held that section 10.2-
803(1)(g) conferred jurisdiction over defendant since the parties
knew that significant portions of the contract were to be per-
formed in this state. The court's opinion relied upon Engineered
Products v. Cleveland Crane and Engineering,3 decided January
7, 1974, which held that if significant events take place in this
state in the performance of a contract, and if this was contem-
plated by both parties when they entered into the contract, juris-
diction may be exercised pursuant to section 10.2-803(1)(g).3 ' The
court's unanimous opinions in Engineered Products and Nucor
Corp. have clearly established the parameters of personal juris-
diction under section 10.2-803(1)(g) for a cause of action arising
from a breach of contract.
In Jacobs v. Association of Independent Colleges and
Schools,32 plaintiffs brought a class action for negligent accredita-
tion against defendant (hereinafter referred to as "AICS"), a non-
28. For the text of this provision see note 22 supra.
29. The plaintiff conceded this to be true. In addition the court made no mention of
any other contacts which defendant may have had with this state. Thus the decision in
this case arguably stands for a broad exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this state
where a non-resident defendant enters into a contract which comtemplates significant
performance in South Carolina, even where such defendant has no other contacts with the
state. The United States Supreme Court, in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957), upheld a similar exercise of jurisdiction by another state court.
30. 262 S.C. 1, 201 S.E.2d 921 (1974).
31. Neither in Engineered Products or Nucor Corp. did the court discuss what consti-
tutes performance of a significant portion of a contract. From the court's decisions in the
two cases, the rule would appear to involve a two-fold test: 1) did the contract result in
significant performance in this state, and 2) did the parties contemplate or reasonably
foresee that such performance would take place here. Additionally, § 10.2-803(2) requires
that if jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to § 10.2-803(1)(g) solely, the cause of action must
have arisen from the contract. See note 1 supra.
32. 265 S.C. 459, 219 S.E.2d 837 (1975).
1976]
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profit corporation chartered in the District of Columbia was
brought on behalf of former students of Draughon's Business Col-
lege (hereinafter referred to as "Draughon's"), a school which
went bankrupt in April 1973. Service of process was accomplished
pursuant to section 10-424, 3 and defendant moved for dismissal
of the action for lack of personal jurisdiction or alternatively to
quash the return of the summons and complaint. The Circuit
Court of Common Pleas, Greenville County, denied the motion,
and defendant appealed. The supreme court unanimously af-
firmed. The court found that defendant's principal and sole place
of business is located in Washington, D.C. and that it neither has
South Carolina employees nor owns or controls property within
the state, nor has ever had a telephone number, bank account,
office or other place of business in South Carolina. Nevertheless'
its activities relating to the accreditation of Draughon's and other
educational institutions in this state34 were sufficient to satisfy
due process requirements in subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the
South Carolina courts.
Due to the unusual nature of defendant's corporate activi-
ties, 3 the court did not rely on prvious cases 6 dealing with this
question in the context of ordinary commercial transactions.
Since section 10-424 authorizes service of process upon a foreign
corporation only where such corporation is "transacting busi-
ness" in this state, however, the court was compelled to interpret
33. See note 22 supra.
34. AICS makes an initial inspection of each school seeking accreditation, and upon
the basis of the information gathered from such inspection, together with other data
submitted to Washington by the school, makes its decision to accredit or not accredit the
institution. Accreditation enables the school to use the AICS seal on publicity materials
and is a substantial factor in a school's ability to obtain funding as well as to attract
students. Each school pays an initial fee for AICS' services and an annual fee based upon
a fixed minimum ($275.00) plus a percentage of gross receipts. Draughon's annual fee for
1962 was $850.00. A fee is also charged for re-inspections, which AICS requires whenever
a school is sold or its business structure changes substantially. AICS listed six South
Carolina schools in its directory for May 1973. AICS conducts inspections of currently
listed schools every six years, and more frequently when re-inspections are required. ACIS
had sent inspection teams to Daughon's in 1970 and 1972, and in 1974 conducted two
inspections in South Carolina. The court held such activities to be substantial enough to
satisfy the requirement under § 10-424 that a foreign corporation be "transacting busi-
ness" within the state, and to also establish the minimum contacts required by the due
process clause.
35. See note 34 supra.
36. See cases collected in the annotation to S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-424 (Cum. Supp.
1975), 10.2-801-803 (Cum. Supp. 1975) and 12-23.14 (1962). "The non-commercial charac-
ter of AICS and the nature of the service it renders makes much precedent in the cases
concerning commercial corporation inappropriate." 265 S.C. at 465, 219 S.E.2d at 840.
[Vol. 28
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss3/9
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
the activities of AICS as analogous to "transacting business" in
order to uphold service of process upon it.37 The court recited the
general rule applicable to suits involving the question of in
personam jurisdiction of state courts over nonresident defen-
dants 8 and proceeded to an analysis similar to that made in
Peeler.3"
As in the latter case, however, the court made no reference
to section 10.2-803, and consequently the Jacobs decision suffers
from the same infirmities discussed earlier with regard to the
Peeler decision. Since section 10-424 is not a long-arm statute, the
court should have first determined that jurisdiction could be ob-
tained under section 10.2-803(1)(a) before proceeding to a due
process consideration."
In light of the foregoing discussion, two additional points are
worth noting. First, it no longer appears necessary to rely on
sections 10-424 and 12-23.14 to serve process upon nonresident
defendants. Section 10.2-804 authorizes service upon nonresi-
dents whenever jurisdiction can be invoked pursuant to section
10.2-803; consequently, subsection (1)(a) of the long-arm statute,
taken together with section 10.2-804, authorizes service of process
upon foreign defendants "transacting any business" in South
Carolina. Thus sections 10-424 and 12-23.14 are merely cumula-
tive provisions, and no good reason appears to justify their reten-
tion in the South Carolina Code. This becomes even more evident
in view of the second consideration. If a party accomplishes serv-
ices pursuant to sections 10-424 or 12-23.14, the court must be
able to find that the defendant is "doing" or "transacting"
37. Although AICS is not transacting business in the commercial sense, it nev-
ertheless 'transacts business' within the meaning of that term in § 10-424 when
it conducts activity in promotion of the purposes for which it was organized,
whether or not those purposes are for pecuniary gain, and when it carries on
transactions constituting a regular, systematic and continuous course of conduct
to accomplish its objectives.
265 S.C. at 465-66, 219 S.E.2d at 840.
38. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and note 14 supra.
39. Citing the Boney test, see note 13 supra, the court found that in analyzing these
four factors, the due process requirements were satisfied on the facts of this case by the
exercise of jurisdiction over AICS. 265 S.C. at 462-65, 219 S.E.2d at 838-40.
40. Since service in Jacobs was effected pursuant to § 10-424, the court needed only
to consider whether AICS was "transacting business" in order to decide whether the
service should be sustained. As discussed supra, § 10-424 is not a long-arm statute, and
thus § 10.2-803(1)(a) should have been regarded as the statute to apply. However, had
plaintiff served process pursuant to § 10.2-804, several other provisions of § 10.2-803(1)
could have served as a basis for sustaining jurisdiction, in addition to "doing business"
under § 10.2-803(1)(a).
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business. Otherwise, the service can be quashed. But if the plain-
tiff serves process pursuant to section 10.2-804, any of the grounds
specified in 10.2-803 can be relied upon to uphold service, includ-
ing, but not limited to the fact that the defendant was
"transacting business." Since it would be unnecessary for an at-
torney to rely only upon section 10-424 or 12-23.14 when section
10.2-804 is much broader, it seems equally pointless to retain
these two more limited and redundant provisons.
The court has held that the long-arm statute is constitutional
and fully effective." The settled law requires the court in every
case to find that there is a long-arm provision which authorizes
the exercise of jurisdiction.2 Although the result reached by the
court in both Peeler and Jacobs may be sound, in view of the
broad expansion of long-arm jurisdiction nationally, 43 the court's
failure to construe and apply section 10.2-803 in either case leaves
the case law surrounding this issue "an enigma wrapped in a
puzzle."
II. DISCOVERY
A. State Court
In Jackson v. H&S Oil Co. 4 the court handed down a judicial
interpretation of Circuit Court Rule 90(c) which requires a party
to supplement its answers to interrogatories when appropriate
during the course of litigation." In this suit for personal injuries
arising out of an automobile accident, newly-associated counsel
for plaintiff sought an examination of his client by a physician
two days before trial. The doctor, however, was unable to com-
plete his examination until the morning of trial. Previously, in
answer to defendant's interrogatories, plaintiff had listed seven
41. Thompson v. Hofmann, 263 S.C. 314, 210 S.E.2d 461 (1974); see note 5 supra.
42. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
43. For an excellent discussion of the cases since International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, see Developments in the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909
(1960). See also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121 (1966); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonres-
ident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1028 (1965).
44. 263 S.C. 407, 211 S.E.2d 223 (1975).
45. S.C. CIR. CT. R. 90 Rule for interogatories
(c) The interrogatories shall be deemed to continue from the time of service
until the time of the trial of the case, so that information sought, which comes
to the knowledge of a party, his representative or attorney. after answers to
interrogatories have been submitted, shall be promptly transmitted to the other
party.
[Vol. 28
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physicians as witnesses but had not included the name of Dr.
Solomon, the physician conducting the eleventh-hour examina-
tion. At the pre-trial conference, counsel for plaintiff informed
opposing counsel that he planned to call Dr. Solomon as an expert
witness. Defendant's counsel made no formal objection to the
trial judge at this time, nor did he move for a continuance or other
appropriate relief.6 However, when plaintiff called Dr. Solomon
on the second day of trial, counsel for defendant objected, arguing
that plaintiff had violated rule 90(c). The trial judge offered coun-
sel for the defendant a chance to confer with the physician at that
time. He refused and Dr. Solomon proceeded to testify. After a
verdict was returned for plaintiff, defendant appealed alleging,
inter alia, that the failure of the trial court to exclude the testi-
mony of Dr. Solomon or take any action to protect appellant's
right constituted error.
The supreme court, with Justice Brailsford writing for a 4-1
majority, held that counsel for plaintiff had complied with the
requirements of rule 90(c) by notifying opposing counsel at the
pre-trial conference of the examination by Dr. Solomon and of
plaintiff's intention to call him as an expert witness. Further-
more, the court noted that even if counsel for plaintiff had
violated rule 90(c), automatic exclusion of Dr. Solomon's testi-
mony would not necessarily follow. The proper sanction, pur-
suant to the rule established in Laney v. Hefley,41 rests within the
discretion of the trial judge . 8 The court added that defendant, by
entering upon trial of the case without objecting to the fact that
Dr. Solomon would be called as a witness, had effectively waived
any right he might otherwise have had to appeal the trial court's
ruling.
46. The opinion of the case is conflicting as to whether any objection at all was made,
but at most it would appear that defendant's counsel objected only to plaintiffs attorney
out of the judge's presence.
47. 262 S.C. 54, 202 S.E.2d 13 (1974). In Laney, the plaintiff's attorney clearly vio-
lated the terms of rule 90(c), but since counsel for defendant had known of the witness'
presence near the scene of the accident and had made no attempt to question the witness
prior to trial, and in view of the weakness of the witness' testimony, which counsel for
defendant conceded was not prejudicial to defendant, the court ruled that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in permitting the witness to testify.
48. The Laney court stated:
Numerous other courts have been concerned with the question of what sanc-
tions, if any, are to be imposed where there is a failure to fully comply with the
rule. . . .The weight of authority is to the effect that such matters, of necessity,
have to be left largely to the discretion of the trial court.
Id. at 58, 202 S.E.2d at 14.
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Justice Littlejohn, in dissent, argued vehemently that Dr.
Solomon should not have been permitted to testify and that a new
trial was warranted. Citing the tremendous expenses already in-
curred by defendant in discovery49 and the crucial nature of Dr.
Solomon's testimony," Justice Littlejohn asserted that allowing
the doctor to testify on such scant notice to defendant's counsel
violated both the letter and spirit of rule 90 and deprived defen-
dant of a fair trial on the critical issue in the case.s"
Circuit Court Rule 90 affords to litigants in South Carolina
only a limited use of interrogatories in pre-trial discovery. Interro-
gatories are limited to six standard questions which are set out
in the rule itself,5" as opposed to the broad-ranging inquiries per-
mitted under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 3 Subsection
(c) of the South Carolina rule clearly indicates that these stan-
dard interrogatories are to continue until trial and that any new
information with regard thereto shall be "promptly transmitted"
to the opposing party. But as the court noted in Jackson, no cutoff
point is provided for transmitting the names of newly-discovered
witnesses or experts.5" Even more significantly, the rule makes no
provision for the imposition of sanctions should new information
not be promptly transmitted. Subsection (f) of rule 9055 provides
49. Counsel for defendants had deposed 36 witnesses, including seven medical doc-
tors, in preparing for trial. 263 S.C. at 415, 211 S.E.2d at 226-27.
50. Justice Littlejohn stated:
If the actual damages verdict is justifiable it is solely because of the testimony
of Dr. Solomon. Apparently none of the other seven doctors would testify that
this plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled. Certainly none of the three
other doctors who were called would testify to that effect.
Id. at 416, 211 S.E.2d at 227 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
51. The court in its opinion stated:
Clearly, the plaintiff received some injuries in the collision. It cannot be seri-
ously questioned but that appellant is liable. The key to this entire case is the
amount of damages which should be paid, and for this reason the testmony of
Dr. Solomon was extremely important.
Id.
52. See S.C. CIa. CT. R. 90(e).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b) provides that "[i]nterrogatories may relate to any matter
which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b). . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) provides that
"[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action ..
54. 263 S.C. at 410, 211 S.E.2d 225.
55. S.C. CIR. CT. R. 90(f) provides:
Failure to Answer Interrogatories-Sanctions If a party fails to respond to
interrogatories propounded under this rule, the party seeking discovery may
apply to the Court for an order compelling compliance therewith. Thereafter the
authority of the Court to enforce this rule and any order directing compliance
14
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for sanctions in cases where there is a failure to respond to interro-
gatories, and the sanction provisions of Circuit Court Rule 8711 are
made to apply if a party refuses to obey a court order compelling
a response. But neither of these sanctions govern the particular
problem involved in this case.
A similar problem has arisen in the federal courts since no
provision is made for the application of sanctions in cases of a
failure to supplement answers to interrogatories under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.58 The answer of the federal courts
to this question59 has been identical to that of the South Carolina
Supreme Court-that it is within the discretion of the trial judge
to determine what, if any, sanctions should be applied."0 This
appears to be a workable, common-sense approach. However, a
more reliable means of insuring fairness to all parties in this
situation would be the amendment of subsection (f) of rule 90 to
provide specifically for this contingency."1
The decision of the majority in Jackson seems to violate the
underlying purposes of discovery.62 In focusing on the good faith
of plaintiff's counsel and the strategy employed by counsel for
defendant, the court overlooked the consideration which ought to
be controlling, viz justice to both parties. On the facts of this case,
where the paramount issue, as Justice Littlejohn pointed out,63
therewith shall be as prescribed in Rule 87(H)(7) (a &b) of the Rules of the
Circuit Court.
56. S.C. CIR. CT. R. 87(H)(7)(a) provides for the imposition of sanctions on a party
who moves for a court order compelling discovery or resists such a motion, if the motion
or refusal to answer was without substantial justification. The sanction is payment of the
expenses of the party making or defending against the unjustified motion.
S.C. Cm. CT. R. 87(H)(7)(b) provides that failure of a party to comply with an order
of court directing an answer may be considered a contempt of court and specifies sanctions
for a willful failure to appear for a deposition.
57. In Jackson, there was no failure to answer, nor was there a motion for an order
compelling supplementation of the answer.
58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33 and 26(e). See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2050 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
59. See, e.g., Washington Hosp. Center v. Cheeks, 394 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Halverson v. Campbell Soup Co., 374 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1967); Clark v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 328 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1964).
60. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
61. Professor Wright has asserted that this would be the preferable solution to this
problem in the federal courts. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2050, at 326 (1970).
62. See Hodge v. Myers, 255 S.C. 542, 545, 180 S.E.2d 203, 205 (1971), where the court
quoted the trial court with approval: ". . . the entire thrust of these rules [i.e., Circuit
Court Rules 43, 97, 88, 89] is for full and fair disclosure to prevent a trial from becoming
a guessing game or one of surprise for either party."
63. See note 50 supra.
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was the extent of plaintiffs employability, the trial court should
have been required to do more than merely offer defendant's
counsel a brief opportunity to question Dr. Solomon immediately
prior to his testifying. The physician's testimony was virtually
determinative on the issue of damages, the only real issue in the
case. Therefore, it would seem that by granting a continuance to
enable defendant's counsel the opportunity to depose the doctor
and provide sufficient time to prepare to meet his testimony, the
trial court could have provided a solution fair to both parties. In
view of the good faith of counsel for plaintiff, and in consideration
of the facts of the case, exclusion of the physician's testimony
would have been inordinately harsh. However, the court's
decision unduly penalized defendant whose counsel was faced
with two equally tenuous alternatives. 4 In light of this case, it
seems clear that rule 90 should be amended to set forth clear
guidelines for resolving the problem of late supplements to inter-
rogatories. If the violation of the rule is due to attorney error or
neglect, the amendment should provide for imposition of sanc-
tions upon the attorney. 5 In a case similar to Jackson, where
neither attorney is at fault, a continuance of the trial should be
mandated by the rule.
B. Federal Court
In Duplan Corp. v.Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz,5
the Fourth Circuit held that an attorney's mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions or legal theories developed in prior termi-
nated litigation are protected absolutely against discovery in sub-
sequent litigation. In this factually and procedurally complex
case, 67 plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the throwsters)
64. The court's opinion shows the strategic dilemma which defendant's counsel faced.
Counsel correctly inferred from the late addition of Dr. Solomon to the list of expert
witnesses that his testimony would go beyond other witnesses and strongly argue for
plaintiff's total disability. Therefore counsel for defendant was faced with a dilemma. He
could proceed with the trial and seek, in the event of an unfavorable verdict, a reversal
on appeal on the ground that defendant's interrogatories were not properly supplemented.
On the other hand, he could seek a continuance, thereby giving up that potential ground
for appeal, and risk being unable to counter the physician's damaging testimony during
a brief continuance.
65. This can be accomplished under Circuit Court Rule 87(H)(7)(a & b),where an
attorney advises a motion for a court order or advises resisting such a motion to compel
discovery.
66. 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
67. See 522 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1975); 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973); 397 F. Supp. 1146
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brought a suit charging defendants (Chavanoz) with antitrust
violations. Plaintiffs furthermore sought a declaratory judgment
decreeing that 21 patents owned by Chavanoz are not valid, not
enforceable, and therefore had not been infringed."8 The discovery
dispute arose when the throwsters sought access to work product
material developed by Chavanoz's attorneys in connection with
settlement agreements with another corporation in 1964.-
Chavanoz claimed that the work product materials were sub-
ject to discovery only upon a showing by the throwsters that they
were in substantial need of the materials and were unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the mate-
rials by other means. 0 The district court initially held that the
(D.S.C. 1974); 370 F. Supp. 790 (D.S.C. 1973); 370 F. Supp. 769 (D.S.C. 1973); 370 F.
Supp. 761 (D.S.C. 1973).
68. For a detailed exposition of the facts of this litigation, see cases cited at note 67
supra.
69. Leesona Corporation instituted a series of lawsuits against Chavanoz in the early
1960's, alleging that one of Chavanoz' licenses was infringing several United States pat-
ents which Leesona owned. Those suits were settled in 1964. The throwsters were appar-
ently seeking to prove in the present action that these prior settlements between Leesona
and Chavanoz included illegal agreements, the intent of which were to gain a monoply,
and also that the prior dealings of Chavanoz with the patent office concerning the Leesona
litigation had been inequitable. The district court in this case initially considered 683
documents, 116 photographs, and 176 pages of reported experiments, all of which Chava-
noz claimed were produced in anticipation of the earlier litigation with Leesona. These
were sought by the throwsters for the purpose of determining the prior knowledge of
Chavanoz as to the invalidity of certain patents Chavanoz is now claiming to be infringed
by the throwsters.
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26. The rule was completely revised in 1970, and the amended
version now contains the following language in subdivision (b)(3):
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (includ-
ing his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without due hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning
the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a
person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement con-
cerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person. If the
request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The provisions of Rule
37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For
purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written state-
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qualified immunity of work product materials does not extend
beyond the immediate case for which they were developed, and
ordered Chavanoz to produce the documents. 7' The circuit court
reversed,72 holding that the qualified immunity extends to subse-
quent litigation as well. On remand, the district court, after re-
viewing the disputed documents, ordered Chavanoz to produce
105 of them. Chavanoz produced 58 of these documents but
claimed the remainder were absolutely immune from discovery
since they contained mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
and legal theories developed by attorneys and other Chavanoz
representatives in connection with the earlier litigation .73 The
district court held that the immunity of these opinion work prod-
uct materials, although absolute as to the litigation for which
they were prepared, becomes merely a qualified immunity once
that litigation terminates, and therefore subject to discovery
upon a showing of "substantial need" and "undue hardship."'
The circuit court, with Judge Widener writing for a three-
judge panel, unanimously reversed. The court first analyzed the
ment signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B)
a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the
person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
71. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, 61 F.R.D. 127 (D.S.C. 1973).
72. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir.
1973).
73. Note that rule 26(b)(3) see note 70 supra, deals with two related but distinct
matters. The initial dispute in this case was over documents which were prepared by
Chavanoz in the prior litigation with Leesona. See note 68 supra. The rule provides that
such documents, if otherwise discoverable pursuant to subsection (b)(1), are subject to
discovery upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship by the party seeking
the materials. The rule further provides that once the requisite showing has been made,
the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, opinions or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative. Chavanoz argued that even though the
throwsters had made the requisite showing and were entitled to access of 58 of the disputed
documents, 47 of these documents were absolutely immune from discovery because they
contained mental impressions, opinions, and legal theories of its attorneys and other
representatives.
74. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974). Judge Hem-
phill reasoned that since the documents sought and the opinions contained therein were
highly relevant to issues in the present litigation, the mental impressions and opinions of
Chavanoz' attorneys in the earlier litigation, were now "operative facts" as to the motives
and intent of Chavanoz in the alleged antitrust conspiracy with Leesona and the alleged
fraud upon the United States Patent Office. See note 68 supra. He asserted that where
opinion work product becomes an operative fact in a subsequent lawsuit, it is no longer
absolutely immune from discovery but may be ordered produced upon the requisite show-
ing by the party seeking discovery.
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amended version of rule 2611 and found that work product materi-
als containing attorney's opinions were intended to be absolutely
protected from discovery. The circuit court rejected the district
court's attempted formulation of an exception to this immunity."6
Although the rule itself is silent on this exact question,7 the
court relied upon the Supreme Court's rationale in the celebrated
case of Hickman v. Taylor,' 8 and found the district court's hold-
ing at odds with the policies underlying that decision. In the
court's view, the main thrust of the Supreme Court's holding in
Hickman was concerned with the protection of lawyers' thought
processes and the adversary system's integrity. To allow opinion
work product materials to be discoverable in subsequent litiga-
tion would undermine the adversary system and be detrimental
to the interests of justice, the court asserted. Acknowledging the
beneficial purposes of the liberal discovery provisions in the fed-
eral courts, the court argued that the absolute immunity of opin-
ion work product materials would, in the end, better serve the
interests of justice than the qualified protection allowed under
the district court's formulation."
Despite the proliferation of litigation concerning work prod-
uct discovery in general, the amended version of rule 261o has not
been extensively considered by the courts.8' It is clear that, as to
the particular litigation for which they are developed, opinion
work product materials are absolutely immune from discovery.
The Fourth Circuit is the only appellate court since the amend-
ment of the Federal Rules82 to have considered the question of
75. See note 70 supra.
76. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
77. Although the rule flatly states that where a court orders discovery of work product
materials, it shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opin-
ions or legal theories of an attorney, there is no reference to subsequent litigation. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see note 70 supra.
78. For a thorough discussion of the Hickman decision and developments since, see
8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2022, at 183-90, and commentators cited therein.
79. The court stated: "We know that our adversary system of justice relies heavily
on the attorneys for its very functioning. . . .In every instance in which an attorney is
consulted. . . 'in anticipation of litigation' he must be free to give his candid, dispassion-
ate opinion, and equally free to record."
80. See note 70 supra.
81. See cases collected in 8 WmIHT & MILLER, § 2026, 229-32, and 1974 supp. at 33,
and cases cited by the Duplan court, 509 F.2d at 735.
82. The court in Duplan, citing WRIGHT & MILLER, noted that cases decided prior to
the amendment of rule 26 must be viewed with extreme care, despite the fact that the
amendment was substantially a codification of the existing case law. 509 F.2d at 735 n. 8,
and 8 WRIGHT & MILE 193. Since rulings on motions concerning discovery are not final
1976]
19
Boyd: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
whether these materials may later be subject to discovery once
the immediate litigation terminates. The Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari3 would seem at least implicitly to signal its approval
of the Fourth Circuit's holding.
Professors Wright and Miller have asserted that a literal
reading of the rule would lead to unsatisfactory results, protecting
work product materials prepared in anticipation of any litigation
by or for a party, regardless of whether the subsequent law suit
is closely related, and providing no protection for similar materi-
als prepared by or for a non-party even though the prior suit is
closely connected to the subsequent one. To avoid such an anom-
alous application of the rule they suggest the use of protective
orders84 and/or a liberal view of the showing required to overcome
the work product immunity. 5 A stronger argument can be made
for absolute immunity of opinion work product in subsequent
litigation, even though the later action is not related to the law-
suit for which the attorney's work product was developed. Despite
the fact that such a construction might result in an occasional
inequitable result, as Professors Wright and Miller postulate, al-
lowing discovery of opinion work product would almost inelucta-
bly lead to the abuses which the Supreme Court in Hickman v.
Taylor and the drafters of Rule 26(b)(3) sought to avoid.8" Consid-
ering both the underlying premises of the federal discovery provi-
sions and the rationale supporting the work product immunity,
the result in Duplan Corp. appears sound. The Fourth Circuit's
resolution of this question in favor of absolute immunity for opin-
ion work product will provide predictability of results and prevent
tactical and strategic abuses of the discovery process.
I. JURY TRIAL
In two 1975 cases dealing with the right to jury trial, the
South Carolina Supreme Court handed down two apparently irre-
concilable opinions which deal with the same legal issue. In
orders, and hence will generally not be appealable, few cases reach the courts of appeal
on this point. The only other case on the circuit court level dealing with this question since
1970 did not address rule 26(b)(3). United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973).
83. 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
84. Protective orders are provided for by FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
85. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2024, at 196-210 (1970); cf. Note, Discovery of an
Attorney's Work Product in Subsequent Litigation, 1974 DUKE L.J. 799.
86. See note 76 supra, and Advisory Committee Note to the 1970 amendments of Rule
26(b)(3), 48 F.R.D. 499 (1970).
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Williford v. Downs,87 the court held that a jury trial does not exist
as a matter of right in an action to partition real estate under
South Carolina Code section 19-238m even though the defendant's
answer raises an issue of title to the property. 9 Despite the fact
that appellant (defendant) did not properly present the issue on
appeal,9" the court reached the merits and held simply that suits
under section 19-238 have long been regarded as suits in equity,"'
therefore, the case would not require trial by jury. Justice Bussey
vehemently dissented, 2 arguing that the real question before the
court was one of title to real property. Consequently, he asserted
that the issue must as a matter of law be tried to a jury, unless
of course the parties waive that right. Justice Bussey additionally
contended that the court should look beyond the immediate ques-
tion of the heir's legitimacy and recognize the question for what
it actually is, namely, a question of title to real property.
87. 265 S.C. 319, 218 S.E.2d 242 (1975).
88. S.C. CODE ANN., § 19-238 (1962) provides:
Excessive legacies to bastards of women living in adultery.-If any person
who is an inhabitant of this State or who has any estate therein shall beget any
bastard child or shall live in adultery with a woman, such person having a wife
or lawful children of his own living, and shall give, by legacy or devise, for the
use and benefit of the woman with whom he lives in adultery or of his bastard
child or children, any larger or greater proportion of the real clear value of his
estate, real or personal, after paying of his debts than one-fourth part thereof,
such legacy or devise shall be null and void for so much of the amount of value
thereof as shall or may exceed such fourth part of his real and personal estate.
89. The testator, Press Williford, devised a ninety-seven acre tract of land in Ander-
son County to plaintiff, his wife, for life, remainder to the defendant (appellant), who was
referred to in the will as his "adopted daughter." Plaintiff sought to have the land parti-
tioned, asserting that defendant was testator's illegitimate child and thus entitled to only
one-fourth of his estate. The defendant demurred and specifically denied that she was an
illegitimate child of the testator, alleging that she had a valid title to the remainder in
fee simple.
90. In its brief, appellant's counsel made no argument that she was entitled to a jury
trial as matter of right, but argued merely that the issue of legitimacy is such a serious
one that it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order a reference of that issue.
Counsel for appellant did not argue that an issue of title to land was raised by her answer
and conceded that both an action for partitioning of real property and the issue of legiti-
macy were matters properly referable to a master. Since the court has held that the
granting of a motion for compulsory reference is appealable only where such would operate
to deprive a party of a mode of trial to which he is entitled as a matter of law, see
Rainwater v. Merchants & Farmers Bank of Cheraw, 108 S.C. 206, 93 S.E. 770 (1971), it
was incumbent upon appellant to show that a jury trial was required, not simply that it
was permitted in this type of case. Thus the appeal could properly have been dismissed
on this basis without any discussion on the merits.
91. See Williams v. Newton, 84 S.C. 98, 65 S.E. 959 (1909); Williams v. Halford, 64
S.C. 396, 42 S.E. 187 (1902).
92. 265 S.C. 319, 323-27, 218 S.E.2d 242, 244-46 (1975).
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Barely two months later in Van Every v. Chinquapin Hollow,
Inc., 3 the supreme court held that, when the defendant's answer
raises an issue of title to land in an action to quiet title,94 that
issue must be tried to a jury. 5 The court affirmed the trial court's
denial of plaintiff's motion for a compulsory order of reference. As
in Williford, the action was clearly equitable," and defendant's
answer put in issue the question of the title to the real estate.
However, the court in this case unanimously held that the state
constitution ' provides a right to jury trial whenever the issue of
title arises,98 unless waived. Noting that a jury verdict would
leave no equitable issues to be decided, the court held that the
legal issue of title should be decided first, since it would render
unnecessary any further consideration of the equitable issue. 9
No rational basis appears upon which these two cases can
be distinguished. Both involve virtually identical questions-
namely, whether a right to jury trial attaches in an equitable
action when the answer puts the issue of title to real property in
dispute. The failure of the court in Van Every even to refer to
its holding in Williford is baffling, for the later decision would
seem either to overrule the former sub silentio or to provide
93. 265 S.C. 474, 219 S.E.2d 909 (1975). This case was decided November 25, 1975,
and Williford was decided September 15, 1975.
94. Plaintiff sought to have the court remove a cloud on his title by declaring that
one particular survey had correctly fixed the boundary lines between his property and that
of defendant. Defendant's answer alleged that he was the owner of the disputed land,
either via deed or alternatively by adverse possession.
95. See Bryan v. Freeman, 253 S.C. 50, 168 S.E.2d 793 (1969).
96. Id. See also Cathcart v. Jennings, 137 S.C. 450, 135 S.E. 558 (1926).
97. Art. 1, § 25 of the South Carolina Constitution provides that "itihe right of trial
by jury shall be preserved inviolate."
98. In State v. Gibbes, 109 S.C. 135, 95 S.E. 346 (1918), the court laid down the rule
that this provision (Art. 1, § 25) guarantees only a right to jury trial in those cases in which
the right obtained at the time of adoption of the South Carolina Constitution. An action
to determine title to real property was one in which the right to jury trial was afforded at
common law. See Frazee v. Beattie, 26 S.C. 348, 2 S.E. 125 (1887). The court has held
that an issue of title to real estate may be raised either in the complaint or by answer.
Barnes v. Rodgers, 54 S.C. 115, 31 S.E. 885 (1898).
S.C. Code Ann. § 10-1056 provides that "[a]n issue of law must be tried by the court,
as also must cases in chancery, unless they be referred as provided in Chapter 16 of this
Title. An issue of fact in an action for the recovery of money only or of specific real or
personal property must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial be waived as provided in §
10-1209 or a reference be ordered." In Hutto v. Hutto, 189 S.C. 26, 199 S.E. 909 (1938),
the court construed the predecessor of this section (section 593 of the 1932 Code) to require
that an issue of title to real property is a purely legal issue, or a fact issue, and as such
must be decided by a jury, unless the party entitled to assert the right has waived it. See
cases cited supra.
99. See Rush v. Thompson, 203 S.C. 106, 26 S.E.2d 411 (1943).
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attorneys with authority on both sides of the same question. The
source of the conflict between these two decisions stems perhaps
from the confusing interaction of the code-pleading system with
the historical tests used by the court in determining when to grant
or deny jury trials. With the enactment in 1870 of the modern
code of procedure, the South Carolina legislature abolished the
formal dichotomy between actions at law and suits in equity. All
courts of general jurisdiction were thereby enabled to hear actions
which involved both legal and equitable issues and to grant both
types of relief. However, due to the interpretation given to article
1, section 25 of the South Carolina Constitution, i.e., that the
right to trial by jury is preserved only in those actions in which
the right was afforded at common law, the courts have been con-
strained to adhere to the law-equity dichotomy in determining
whether such a right attaches in each one. The problem has been
further complicated by the attempt in the 1870 Code to specify
those types of actions in which the right to a jury trial may be
demanded. Section 10-1056 limits the right of jury trial to those
actions involving issues of fact in suits for the recovery of money
or the recovery of specific real or personal property.
The court in Wiliford focused on the historical treatment of
section 19-238 cases and did not discuss the provisions of section
10-1056, which guarantee a jury trial when the issue is one of title
to real property. Reasoning that an action under section 19-238
has traditionally been regarded as equitable and that there is no
right to jury trial in an equitable action, the court concluded that
the case was properly tried without a jury. In his dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Bussey relied upon both the constitutional and statu-
tory provisions, viewing them as a mandate that the traditionally
legal issue of title must be tried to a jury. He distinguished those
cases relied upon by the majority as not specifically addressing
the question of title to real property. Moreover, the dissenting
Justice cited other cases which hold that where an issue of title
is raised in a suit to partition real property, such an issue must
be determined by a jury. His analysis is more persuasive than
that of the majority, which failed to confront squarely the fact
that this was an issue of title to real estate. Although the majority
addressed the merits, its opinion was short, merely noting that
this was an action to void a will. As Justice Bussey maintained,
such an approach failed to recognize the real question which un-
derlay the action. The appeal should have either been dismissed
1976]
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on procedural grounds without discussion of the merits,""0 or the
appellant should have been granted a jury trial as to the legal
issue of title to the property.''
In Van Every the court re-affirmed the right to jury trial
when the title to real property is at issue and held that the de-
fendant's answer raising the issue of title to the land entitled
him to a jury trial, notwithstanding the fact that actions to quiet
title, like actions to partition real estate, have long been consid-
ered equitable in nature. The court again did not refer to section
10-1056, but instead held that Article I, section 25 of the South
Carolina Constitution required that the issue of title be tried to
a jury. In addition the Van Every court relied upon previous cases
holding that when the defendant's answer raises an issue of para-
mount title, which, if established, would defeat plaintiff's action,
that issue must be submitted to a jury.' 2 The court's approach
in this case is analogous to that of Justice Bussey in his dissent
in Williford.
The divergence in the result reached by the court in these two
cases may likely be explained by the supreme court's view of
section 19-238 as inherently equitable. Hence the court in
Williford did not apply the constitutional and statutory provi-
sions which the Van Every court deemed controlling. The pre-
ferred disposition would have been to treat all cases raising the
issue of title to real property as triable to a jury. This approach
would prmote internal consistency in the code and safeguard the
citizens' right to trial by jury when asserting title to real property.
IV. VENUE
In Holson v. Gosnell, 113 the South Carolina Supreme Court
handed down an extremely liberal and forward-looking opinion,
100. See note 90 supra.
101. If defendant in Williford was in fact the legitimate child of the testator, then
she was the owner in fee simple of the remainder and partitioning would not be proper. It
would clearly seem that defendant's answer in Williford places the title to real property
in issue as effectively as the answer in Van Every, and no real distinction can be made on
this ground.
102. This finds a parallel in the so-called equitable "cleanup doctrine", which, prior
to the merger of law and equity, enabled courts sitting in equity to grant legal relief when
such relief was incidental to the equitable cause which formed the main subject of the
action. This doctrine tended to reduce the burden which would otherwise have been placed
on the courts if a separate action at law should have been required in order to dispose
finally of all the issues in the case.
103. 264 S.C. 619, 216 S.E.2d 539 (1975).
[Vol. 28
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unanimously holding that a national bank is located within any
county in which it operates a branch and that the bank may
consequently be sued in any such county. The court was faced
with the question of the proper construction to be given a federal
statute which deals with the proper venue of suits against na-
tional banks. ' The statute specifies the venue for suits both in
federal court, as well as in state courts, as follows:
Actions and proceedings against any association under this
chapter may be had in any district or territorial court of the
United States held within the district in which such association
may be established, or in any state, county or municipal court
in the county or city in which said association is located having
jurisdiction in similar cases.0 5
Plaintiffs brought suit in Saluda County under the state court
venue provision of the above statute, against several defendants,
one of whom was a national bank. First State National (Bank)
alleging fraudulent sales of securities. Although some of the se-
curities were sold in Saluda County, the parties stipulated that
the action was a transitory one not involving the defendant
bank's transactions at its Saluda branch. The bank, which was
chartered and established in Aiken County, argued that the suit
was improperly instituted in Saluda County, because the federal
statute requires that it be sued only in Aiken County. The Com-
mon Pleas Court of Saluda County denied defendants' motion
for a change of venue, and the bank appealed. On appeal plain-
tiffs urged that the bank had waived its statutory privilege by
establishing and operating a branch office in Saluda County.
The supreme court, per Justice Ness, after noting the origin
and purpose of the federal venue provision,' 0 cited recent
criticisms of the statute which argue that that section has become
increasingly outmoded and excessively restrictive in view of mod-
104. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970). What is now 12 U.S.C. § 94 is derived from the National
Bank Act, ch. 58, § 59, 12 Stat. 681, Feb. 25, 1863, which was amended by the National
Bank Act, ch. 106, § 57, 13 Stat. 116-17, June 3, 1864, and later incorporated into the
National Bank Act, ch. 80, § 5198, 18 Stat. 320, Feb. 18, 1875. See Mercantile Nat'l Bank
v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 567-72 (1963), which contains a compilation of the pertinent
national bank legislation.
105. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970) (emphasis added).
106. 264 S.C. at 621; see note 104 supra. The court noted that "[tlhe purpose of such
a restrictive provision is to prevent interruption in their business that might result from
• . . [the banks'] books being sent to distant counties in obedience to process from state
courts." First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 145 (1889).
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ern banking practices.' 7 Since it is well settled that the require-
ments of section 94 are mandatory when a transitory cause of
action is involved, despite the permissive language of the statute,
the court faced the sole issue of whether a national bank is located
in a county wherein it is operating a branch office.' 8 In answering
this question in the affirmative, the court shrugged aside the view
of most lower federal and state courts that a national bank is not
located in a county for venue purposes merely because it operates
a branch office there."0 " "While we take cognizance of these deci-
107. The statute under consideration in this case was enacted at a time when banks
kept only one set of records and branch banking was unknown. The commentators have
argued that in view of the widespread use of computers and duplicate records, and the
proliferation of branch banking, the procedural advantages which the act provides na-
tional banks, see note 106 supra, are no longer necessary. See ALI STUDY OF DIWSION OF
JtURISDIrON BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 77, 412-13 (1969); Note, An Assault on
the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 765 (1966); Comment,
Venue Sanctuary of National Banks - The Proper Construction of 12 U.S.C. Section 94
Places the Venue of Actions Against a National Bank in Any County in Which the Bank
Operates a Branch Office, 26 S.C.L. REV. 643 (1975); Comment, Venue - In an Action
Against a National Bank Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act Supersedes the Venue
Provisons of the National Bank Act, 52 TEx. L. REv. 124 (1974); Comment, Restricted
Venue in Suits Against National Banks: A Procedural Anachronism, 15 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 179 (1973).
108. In Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 567-72 (1963) the court held
that a national bank can be sued only in the county wherein it is located, despite the fact
that the statute employy the word "may". That case involved a state court action, and
the issue before the court was whether or not the language of the statute was permissive
or mandatory. The court in Mercantile Nat'l Bank was not faced with the question of
whether a national bank is "located" in a county where it opeates a branch office and has
never reached the precise issue facing the South Carolina Supreme Court in Holson.
109. The lower federal and state courts which have faced this question have generally
defined "located" and "established" interchangeably, and these cases do not distinguish
between suits in federal or state forums in construing the application of 12 U.S.C. § 94.
Helco, Inc. v. first Nat'l City Bank, 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972); First Nat'l Bank v. United
States Dist. Court, 468 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1972); United States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434
F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1970); Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951); cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952); American Sur. Co. v. Bank of Cal., 133 F.2d 160 (9th Cir.
1943); Leonardi v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied 298 U.S. 677
(1936); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kader v.
First Nat'l Bank of Fort Myers, 387 F. Supp. 535 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Tanglewood Mall, Inc.
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 371 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 508 F.2d 838 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Staley v. Homeland, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1344
(E.D.N.C. 1974); Southeast Guaranty Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp.
1001 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1973);
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. James Talcott, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 133 N.J. Super
462, 337 A.2d 390 (1975); Security First Nat'l Bank v. Tattersall, - La. ---., 311 So.2d
218 (1975); Weichart v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 39 A.D.2d 819, 333 N.Y.S.2d
94 (1972); Murphy v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, - Iowa .., 228 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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sions, we do not think their logic is sound,"110 the court stated.
The court went on to note that the National Bank Act had been
amended to allow banks to establish a statewide system of
branches"' and that the courts should thus consider this question
in light of these revisions rather than by "arbitrary and anti-
quated concepts." ' 2 Relying upon recent state court decisions
from California"' and North Carolina,' the court held that
"when a bank operates a branch in a county other than that of
its organizational charter, it is present there physically, organiza-
tionally and transactionally. We think the conclusion is impelling
that it is located there within the meaning of the statute.""5 The
court further drew upon the policies underlying the liberal venue
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Federal Securities Acts"' to but-
tress its conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that the instant suit
was not brought under those statutes, since activities similar to
the type proscribed by the Acts were involved and the purity of
the securities market place was allegedly infringed."7
Although Justice Ness' opinion lacked a detailed discussion
of this controversial issue, the court's conclusion appears emi-
nently sound. The restrictive interpretation given the federal
statute has been vigorously assailed, as the court noted, because
it provides national banks unwarranted protection against legiti-
mate suits and unduly hampers plaintiffs in bringing such ac-
110. 264 S.C. at 622, 216 S.E.2d at 540.
111. Id. at 623. The amendments alluded to were implemented by the McFadden
Act, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended by 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970), and by 48 Stat. 189
(1933), as amended by 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970). See Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanc-
tuary of National Banks, supra note 106, at 769.
112. 264 S.C. at 623, 216 S.E.2d at 540.
113. Central Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 962, 106 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1973).
114. Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 281 N.C. 525,
189 S.E.2d 266 (1972).
115. 264 S.C. at 623, 216 S.E.2d at 540-41.
116. The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended by 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)
to -77(aa) (1970), and the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as
amended by 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) to -78(hh) (1960) both contain much broader venue pro-
visions than 12 U.S.C. 1 94. Recent cases in the federal courts do not agree as to the
application of these conflicting sections to cases in which a national bank is being sued
for fraudulent sale of securities. Compare Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483
F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1973) and Lavin v. Great Western Sugar Co., 274 F. Supp. 974 (D.N.J.
1967) with United States Nat'1 Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970) and Bruns,
Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2nd Cir. 1968). See
also Comment, Venue-In an Action Against a National Bank Section 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act Supercedes the Venue Provisions of the National Bank Act, 52 TEx. L. Rav.
124 (1974).
117. 264 S.C. at 623-24, 216 S.E.2d at 541.
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tions."5 The court's emphasis on the legislative history of the Act
and on modern banking practices, although not set forth in depth,
is well-placed and led to a fair and reasonable construction of the
statute. In following the lead of California and North Carolina,"'
the court placed itself firmly in the forefront among those courts
which have faced this issue in abandoning out-moded concep-
tions of banking and an overly conservative adherence to
questionable legal precedents. However, the court could have
more adequately set forth the rationale for its decision, rather
than disposing of the question in such a summary fashion. In view
of the numerous decisions by courts coming to an opposite conclu-
sion on this question,12 and the far-reaching nature of the court's
decision,' 2' a more painstaking analysis seems warranted than
that given by the Court.
In Security Mills of Asheville, Inc.,'22 the North Carolina
Supreme Court focused on the different wording employed by
Congress when it amended 12 U.S.C. § 94 to locate venue for suits
brought in state courts. Specifically it noted that venue would lie
where the bank was "located" rather than, as for venue in fedeal
courts, where the bank was "established."' 23 From this is gleaned
an intent for a different rule to apply in state courts than the one
applied in federal tribunals.' Together with the revision of the
National Bank Act to allow branch banking, argued the court, the
difference in language reasonably mandates a more liberal con-
118. See note 107 supra.
119. See notes 113-14 supra.
120. See note 109 supra.
121. The court held that a national bank may be sued in a county where it operates
a branch office, regardless of whether the suit involves transactions arising from that
branch and irrespective of the number of branch banks established within the forum
county. The parties here stipulated that the plaintiff's cause of action was transitory and
did not arise from the defendant bank's transactions at the Saluda County branch office.
The only exceptions to the narrow construction given 12 U.S.C. § 94 recognized by most
other courts have been in cases involving local actions and in those instances where the
actions of the defendant bank, either before or after suit, have been held to amount to a
waiver of its statutory privilege against being sued in jurisdictions other than the one in
which it is chartered. For a detailed discussion of these exceptions and cases which have
propounded them, see the commentators cited in note 107 supra. Plaintiffs in Holson
apparently argued that the bank had waived its statutory privilege by establishing and
operating a branch office in Saluda County, but the court concluded that there was no
privilege to be waived. Although this interpretation has been urged by several commenta-
tors, few courts have subscribed to such an expansive reading of the statute.
122. 281 N.C. 525, 189 S.E.2d 266 (1972).
123. 281 N.C. at 529-30, 189 S.E.2d at 469-70.
124. Id. at 530, 189 S.E.2d at 270.
[Vol. 28
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struction of the venue provision when suit is brought in a state
forum.' 5 The North Carolina court asserted that other courts
which have held that a national bank may not be sued in a county
wherein it operates a branch bank have failed to give adequate
consideration to the actual wording of the statute, rendering
those contrary decisions unpersuasive.'1
8
Similarly, in Central Bank v. Superior Court'2 the California
Court of Appeals carefully scrutinized prior cases on this question
and criticized their reasoning.1 2 Furthermore, it found them not
directly dispositive of the precise question facing the California
court, 129 as well as not directly dispositive of the question ad-
dressed in Security Mills and Holson. These cases, reasoned the
California judges, missed the real point of the federal venue stat-
ute, and the validity of those cases was undercut by their failure
to analyze properly the legislative history of the Act or to under-
stand sufficiently the modern commercial practices of national
banks.2 °
An analysis along the lines of the North Carolina and Califor-
nia courts would have been more authoritative and persuasive
than the unduly truncated rationale set forth by Justice Ness.
Nevertheless, the opinion is noteworthy, since it stripped national
banks in South Carolina of their archaic immunity from suits
brought in counties in which they operate only a branch office.
The court, in so doing, placed South Carolina in step with the
enlightened minority of jurisdictions which have decided this
question against narrow venue restrictions.
V. SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Brown v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co. 131 involved an interest-
125. Id. at 530-33, 189 S.E.2d at 270-71.
126. Id. at 530-32, 189 S.E.2d at 270-71.
127. 30 Cal. App. 3d 962, 106 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1973).
128. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 967-68, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 915-16.
129. Id. at 96.7-68, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 915-16.
130. The California court stated:
There is nothing in section 94 or the accompanying legislation which places
venue in one place to the exclusion of all others. The Leonardi case and its
progeny. . . fail to recognize that location of the banking business, not location
of headquarters, is the venue statute's prime concern; fail to appraise the statute
in the light of the associated legislation enacted in 1927; turn, instead, to the
dim light of an 1871 decision handed down in the era and formulated in the
context of single-office banking. They frustrate congressional intent to allow
national banks to be sued where they establish their banking business.
Id. at 970-71, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
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ing question related to supplemental pleadings. Plaintiffs filed six
actions against defendant insurance companies alleging that de-
fendants wrongfully, illegally and fraudulently cancelled or
lapsed their policies. The action was commenced by service of
summonses upon the Chief Insurance Commissioner of South
Carolina on October 17, 1968. The complaints were not acually
served until August 27, 1969.132 Shortly after the summonses were
served and prior to service of the complaint defendants reinstated
plaintiff's policies unconditionally. The plaintiffs, however, failed
to pay the premiums upon reinstatement, and the policies lapsed
on November 25, 1968. In their answers, defendants made a gen-
eral denial and additionally alleged as a defense the reinstate-
ment of the policies, annexing to the answer copies of four letters
sent to plaintiffs' attorney pertaining to the reinstatement and
lapse of the policies. Plaintiffs moved to strike from the answers
the allegations referring to the reinstatement and the letters. The
trial court granted the motion and defendants appealed from this
order.
The supreme court, per Justice Littlejohn, reversed, holding
that there was an error of law in the trial court's grant of the
motion to strike.'33 The high court ruled that the allegations of
defendants should have been permitted as a supplemental plead-
ing. The court acknowledged that the case did not technically
involve supplemental pleadings since the facts alleged by defen-
dants occurred prior to the service of the complaint.34 The court
felt, nevertheless, that the rationale for allowing supplemental
pleadings applied in this case and that the matter alleged by
defendants was clearly not irrelevant and immaterial. Thus, the
court believed, the interests of justice dictated that defendants be
131. 264 S.C. 190, 213 S.E.2d 726 (1975).
132. This procedure is authorized pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-633 (1962).
133. In Simonds v.Simonds, 232 S.C. 185, 101 S.E.2d 494 (1958), cited in the majority
opinion, the court stated that "[tihe refusal of a motion to file a supplemental answer is
ordinarily within the discretion of the Circuit Court and will not be reversed by this Court
except for an abuse of such discretion, or unless the action of the trial Judge was controlled
by some error of law, or unless some substantial right is thereby lost or impaired." Id. at
196, 101 S.E.2d at 499. See also J.M.S., Inc. v. Theo, 241 S.C. 394, 128 S.E.2d 697 (1962),
which applies a similar rule for motions to strike.
134. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-610 (1962) provides in part that "[tihe plaintiff and
defendant, respectively may be allowed on motion to make a supplementary complaint,
answer or reply alleging facts material to the case occurring after the former complaint,
answer or reply, or of which the party was ignorant when his former pleading was
made. .. ."
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allowed to set up the subsequent matter in their answer.135 Justice
Bussey, with whom Justice Lewis concurred, filed an opinion in
which he concurred in part,'30 agreeing with Justice Littlejohn
that the motion should not have been granted, but urging that it
should not properly be considered as a supplemental pleading,
but rather should be allowed only because it relates to the issue
of mitigation of damages.'3
Under the terms of § 10-610 of the Code, a supplemental
pleading is proper only upon a motion to the court which estab-
lishes a prima facie showing that facts which are relevant and
material to the issues in the case have arisen after the making of
a complaint, answer or reply, or that the party was ignorant of
the additional facts at the time the former pleading was made.'
3
Technically the matter alleged by the defendants could not pro-
perly be considered as a supplemental pleading, since the defen-
dants had not previously answered. However, as both the
majority and concurring opinions pointed out, the unusual delay
between the commencement of the action and the filing of the
complaint brought about a unique situation. Upon the particular
facts of this case, the result reached is more just, as well as more
efficient, than would have been the alternative of granting the
motion to strike. However, the concurring opinion seems more
persuasive than the majority's overly liberal construction of the
135. The court stated:
Had the complaints been served along with the summonses it would have been
in order for Coastal to have moved under Section 10-610 for permission to plead
these matters which occurred after the commencement of the action. As it
developed, the Complaints were not served until almost a year after the facts
which appellants seek to plead occurred.
264 S.C. at 194.
136. 264 S.C. 190, 195, 213 S.E.2d 726, 729 (1975) (Bussey, J., concurring in part).
137. Justice Bussey wrote:
In my opinion the striken factual matters had no relevance whatever to any issue
in the case save possibly mitigation of actual damages sustained by plaintiffs.
Under this decision of this Court in Latimer v. York Cotton Mills, 66 S.C. 135,
44 S.E. 559, a defendant is apparently required to plead factual matters which
tend to mitigate actual damages sustained by a plaintiff. Since there was a great
delay on the part of the plaintiff in serving the complaint, justice requires that
the defendant be allowed to allege and prove, if it can, facts occurring after the
service of the summons which tend to mitigate the actual damages sustained.
Id.
138. Simonds v. Simonds, 232 S.C. 185, 197, 101 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1957).
1976]
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statute. Such construction seems likely to produce confusion in
subsequent cases. 35
W. Howard Boyd, Jr.
139. The concurring opinion rests upon a sounder premise than does that of the
majority. Justice Lewis more clearly emphasized that a supplemental pleading was not
involved in this case and based his opinion upon an alternative ground, while Justice
Littlejohn simply drew an attenuated analogy between a fact situation properly giving rise
to a motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading and the facts involved in the case at
bar. The majority's approach to the case will leave courts and lawyers uncertain as to what
the decision portends for similar cases in the future, while the concurring opinion is
unambiguous and would provide clarity and predictability in future cases involving this
and similar issues.
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